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Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 ONY-00 /023 W
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P 160947Z FEB 78
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9310

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 USNATO 1553

LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR TEXT (DESTROY ALL OTHERS)

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E.O.11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: NATO, AMGT, XX
SUBJECT: US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AT NATO

REFS: (A) 77 STATE 291277, (B) 77 STATE 296053
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INTRODUCTION:

. WE START FROM THE PREMISE THAT WASHINGTON IS FULLY AWARE OF THE PAST YEAR'S EVENTS AND THAT THE BASIC US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES TOWARDS THE ALLIANCE REMAIN VALID. ACCORDINGLY, WE WILL NEITHER REVIEW THE PROGRESS IN MEETING THESE GOALS, WHICH WE HAVE REPORTED OVER THE PAST 12 MONTHS, NOR ARGUE THE FUNDAMENTALS OF US TIES TO NATO. WE WILL, RATHER, SEEK TO STIMULATE A DISCUSSION ON A FEW KEY ISSUES THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE ALLIANCE FACE OVER THE COMING YEAR:
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. 1. SALT II AND BEYOND - REGIONAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.
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. 2. RB/ER WARHEADS.
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. 3. THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AND ITS FOLLOWUP: THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM, THE EAST-WEST STUDY AND ARMAMENTS COOPERATION.
-
. WE ALSO COMMENT ON SEVERAL OTHER ISSUES TO WHICH THE

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US WILL WISH TO GIVE CONTINUING POLICY-LEVEL ATTENTION:
. (A) THE ALLIANCE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.
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. (B) MBFR.
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. (C) CSCE.
. (D) POSSIBLE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.
-
. (E) GREECE-TURKEY-NATO RELATIONS.
-
. (F) THE NORTHERN FLANK.
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. (G) SPAIN AND NATO.
-
. (H) PUBLIC SUPPORT.
-
. WE HAVE NOT COVERED A HOST OF OTHER ALLIANCE ISSUES, SOME OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AN EXHAUSTIVE LIST WOULD SMOTHER THE INTEREST OF OUR READERS.
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I. KEY ISSUES:
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. THE CURRENT DEBATE CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF SALT ON ALLIED SECURITY GOES TO THE CORE OF US-ALLIANCE RELATIONS. SOME ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE FRG, HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH PERCEIVED DISPARITIES IN REGIONAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. INDEED, THERE IS CURRENTLY NO MORE IMPORTANT ISSUE IN US-EUROPEAN DEFENSE RELATIONS THAN DEVELOPING A CONSENSUS IN THE ALLIANCE ON HOW TO RESPOND TO THE PERCEIVED NEW AND MORE THREATENING SOVIET REGIONAL CAPABILITY.
-
. -- THE US HAS ATTEMPTED TO DISSUADE THE ALLIES FROM DEALING WITH REGIONAL SYSTEMS SEPARATELY. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THE CONTINUUM OF NATO DETERRENT FORCES RATHER THAN EQUIVALENCE IN SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE EAST-WEST BALANCE. THESE ARGUMENTS REMAIN UNDER CHALLENGE. MOREOVER, THE US STRESS ON THE NEED TO CORRECT THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IN EUROPE, WHILE APPROPRIATE IN TERMS OF STRENGTHENING THE OVERALL DETERRENT, IN THE CONTEXT OF PERCEIVED WESTERN EUROPEAN VULNERABILITY TO SOVIET REGIONAL SYSTEMS COULD REVIVE CONCERNS THAT WE MIGHT BE SEEKING TO CONFINE A WAR TO EUROPE, I.E., TO DECOUPLE.

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. ALLIED CONCERN OVER SALT, AND PARTICULARLY THE CRUISE MISSILE ASPECTS OF THE PROTOCOL, REFLECTS THEIR UNEASE THAT THE NEW TREATY WILL NOT ONLY EXEMPT SOVIET SYSTEMS TARGETED AGAINST EUROPE, BUT MIGHT ALSO CONSTRAIN THE MOST OBVIOUS NEW COUNTER TO THESE SYSTEMS, THE CRUISE MISSILE.
. THERE IS NO SINGLE, CLEARLY DEFINED ALLIED VIEW ON HOW BEST TO RESPOND TO THIS SITUATION, AND IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO MEET THE CONCERNS OF SOME ALLIES (I.E., THE FRG) WITHOUT RAISING ADDITIONAL CONCERNS AMONG OTHERS.
. THE QUESTION OF THE REGIONAL NUCLEAR SYSTEM BALANCE

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 ONY-00 /023 W
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P 160947Z FEB 78
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LIMDIS

2ND C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TRXT)
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CUTS DIRECTLY ACROSS ALL OUR FUTURE ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS AND OBJECTIVES. THE ALLIES ARE CERTAIN TO EVALUATE FUTURE ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS BY THE PRINCIPAL CRITERION OF HOW REGIONAL STABILITY WILL BE ENHANCED. IN US DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ALLIES, ON BOTH SALT AND TNF MODERNIZATION, WE SEE A NEED FOR CLOSE SYNCHRONIZATION BETWEEN OUR GOALS AND THEIR INTERESTS.
-
. THUS:
-
. -- WE SHOULD REINFORCE THE LINE OF ALLIED THINKING THAT SEES A NEED NOT SO MUCH TO COUNTER SOVIET SYSTEMS, PER SE, AS TO STABILIZE THE REGIONAL BALANCE. THE US SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT STABILITY CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH A COMBINATION OF FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, DEPLOYMENTS, AND ARMS CONTROL CONSTRAINTS.
-
. -- TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THESE ISSUES AND

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WITH THE ALLIED CONCERNS, THE US APPROACH MUST EMBRACE THE TOTAL ALLIANCE DEFENSE SPECTRUM AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT KEY ELEMENTS OF THE US-USSR RELATIONSHIP, BILATERAL US-ALLIED DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS, NATO WORK ON TNF, AND THE OVERALL
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IMPACT OF US ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS.
-
. -- WHATEVER THE EVENTUAL DECISION AS TO FORM, SCOPE AND MANNER OF THE POST-SALT II DISCUSSIONS, THE US MUST DEMONSTRATE A WILLINGNESS TO SHARE WITH ITS ALLIANCE PARTNERS ITS THINKING ON ARMS CONTROL AND REGULATION OF THE OVERALL MILITARY BALANCE, AND IT MUST DEAL WITH ALLIED, AND ESPECIALLY FRG, CONCERNS IN A WAY THAT WILL KEEP THEM SQUARELY IN THE ALLIANCE CONTEXT.
-
RB/ER:
-
. THIS ISSUE NEEDS TO BE RESOLVED QUICKLY IN ORDER TO AVOID FURTHER UNRAVELING OF ALLIANCE COHESION AND GIVING THE SOVIETS AN APPARENT POLITICAL VICTORY. MOREOVER, THE THREATENING BREZHNEV LETTER AND SOVIET "BAN THE BOMB" CAMPAIGN HAVE MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO ADOPT A NEGATIVE DECISION WITHOUT APPEARING TO HAVE BOWED TO SOVIET PRESSURE.
-
. IN CONTINUING TO DELAY DECISION, THE ALLIANCE PROJECTS INDECISIVENESS, A SENSE OF BEING ACTED UPON RATHER THAN ACTING. SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND EMOTIONAL MISUNDERSTANDING HAVE KEPT DOMESTIC DEBATES ALIVE AND ARE LIKELY TO DO SO UNTIL A DECISION IS MADE. IN THE MEANTIME, ALLIES ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO FOUNDER ON THE QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT OR FALL AWAY AS THE DUTCH APPEAR TO BE DOING.
-
. MOST ALLIES SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS OF APPEARING TO YIELD TO SOVIET INTIMIDATION. AND, IF THIS ISSUE IS NOT RESOLVED BEFORE THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, IT IS LIKELY TO BE HIGHLIGHTED BY THE PRESS, THUS REVEALING NATO'S INDECISIVENESS AND DETRACTING FROM THE APPEARANCE
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OF RESOLVE AND SOLIDARITY THAT WE HOPE TO SEE FLOW FROM THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT.
-
. WE BELIEVE THE NECESSARY FIRST STEP TO ANY POSSIBLE LINKAGE OF RB/ER TO FUTURE ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS MUST

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BE AN UNQUALIFIED DECISION TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY. THEN, AS THE PRESIDENT NOTED IN WARSAW, WE COULD INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER RB/ER IN FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS NOT LIMITED TO A SINGLE WEAPON AND LINKED TO APPROPRIATE SOVIET REDUCTIONS. OTHERWISE THE SOVIETS WILL NOT TAKE OUR LINKAGE SERIOUSLY AND WILL BE ABLE TO DRAW OUT DISCUSSIONS WHILE NATO FOREGOES ITS MILITARY ADVANTAGE AND THE SOVIETS REMAIN FREE TO HAMMER AWAY AT THE "NEUTRON BOMB" IN PUBLIC.

-

. WE BELIEVE THE US MUST TAKE THE LEAD IN ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. THOUGH WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK BROAD ALLIED SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYMENT, AT THIS POINT IT APPEARS TO US THE MOST VIABLE COURSE WOULD BE FOR THE US TO INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS BILATERALLY WITH AT LEAST THE FRG AND THE UK, INCLUDING CLARIFYING ITS VIEWS ON ANY ARMS CONTROL LINK.

-

. WE NEED CLEAR SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYMENT FROM THESE KEY COUNTRIES PLUS ONE OR TWO SMALLER ALLIES. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE REMAINING ALLIES, THOUGH PERHAPS NOT ACCEPTING RB/ER DEPLOYMENT ON THEIR SOIL, WOULD TAKE A PUBLIC STANCE RECOGNIZING THE MILITARY NEED FOR AND THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL ALLIES TO DEPLOY SUCH WEAPONS.

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THE NATO SUMMIT:

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. OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE HERE IS TO ENSURE THAT CURRENT NATO PROJECTS POINTING TOWARD THE SUMMIT ARE DONE RIGHT AND ARE DONE ON TIME, I.E., THE LTDP AND THE EAST-WEST STUDY.

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P 160947Z FEB 78
FM USMISSION USNATO
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LIMDIS

C O R RE C TE D C O P Y (TEXT)
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. WE SUGGEST THAT, IF WE DECIDE TO TALK TO THE ALLIES BILATERALLY IN WASHINGTON ABOUT OUR SUMMIT GOALS AND ANY NEW INITIATIVES, AS WAS DONE LAST YEAR, WE SHOULD TELL PERMREPS WHAT WE ARE DOING AND GIVE THEM SOMETHING TO DO EARLY SO THEY WILL NOT ONCE AGAIN TUG AT THE BILATERAL LEASH.
-
. WE THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO LAUNCH THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS HERE IN MARCH OR EARLY APRIL WITH A PRESENTATION TO LUNS AND THE COUNCIL ON PRELIMINARY US THINKING ABOUT THE SUMMIT.
-
. THE RECENT EXCHANGES OF VISITS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND NATO HEADQUARTERS OFFICERS CONCERNED WITH SUMMIT ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE HELPED TO GET THIS ASPECT OFF TO A GOOD START AND PROVIDE A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR OTHER ASPECTS OF SUMMIT PREPARATIONS.
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LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTDP):
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. THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM HAS BEEN WELL LAUNCHED AND KEY ALLIES ARE PROJECTING MODEST REAL INCREASES IN
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DEFENSE SPENDING. THE TASK BEFORE US NOW IS TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM ENGENDERED OVER THE PAST YEAR, BOTH INTO AND BEYOND THE SUMMIT.
-
. THE TASK FORCES ESTABLISHED TO DEVELOP LONG-TERM ACTION PROGRAMS IN TEN PRIORITY AREAS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED A MORE IN-DEPTH AND LONG-TERM ANALYSIS OF PRIORITY DEFENSE NEEDS THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE UNDER ROUTINE NATO PLANNING PROCEDURES.
-
. THE RESULTS OF THIS INTENSE EFFORT -- THE FINAL INDIVIDUAL LTDP TASK FORCE REPORTS -- WILL BE ARRIVING SHORTLY. THESE REPORTS WILL VARY IN QUALITY, PROGRAMMATIC CONTENT, AND TECHNICAL DETAIL. WE EXPECT THAT THESE REPORTS WILL PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT

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OF A LONG-TERM PROGRAM FOR SUMMIT APPROVAL. THEY WILL BE SUBJECT TO DETAILED REVIEW OVER THE NEXT THREE MONTHS, WITH ALLIES MOST CONCERNED OVER THEIR COST AND IMPACT ON NATIONAL PLANS. ALLIES, UNDERSTANDABLY, WILL TRY TO LIMIT REAL NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO PROCEDURAL AND LOW-COST MEASURES, REMITTING COSTLY HARDWARE PROGRAMS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

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. OUR EFFORTS BETWEEN NOW AND THE SUMMIT MUST BE DIRECTED TOWARD:

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. -- ORGANIZING AND PRESENTING THE LONG-TERM PROGRAM IN A FORM SUITABLE FOR MINISTERIAL AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW AND DECISION;

-

. -- ENSURING THAT THE PROGRAMS ARE NOT WATERED DOWN, IN AN ATTEMPT TO REACH LOWEST-COMMON-DENOMINATOR CONSENSUS, TO MERE REFLECTIONS OF EXISTING PLANS, BUT PROVIDE FOR ADDED DEFENSE CAPABILITY, AND

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. -- OBTAINING ALLIED AGREEMENT TO UNDERTAKE A SET OF SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAMS.

-

AS THE FY-1979 US DEFENSE BUDGET DEMONSTRATES, WE HAVE MADE SOME RADICAL CHANGES IN OUR PLANNING, DRAMATICALLY REORIENTING OUR EFFORTS TOWARD NATO; WE SHOULD EXPECT ALLIES TO MAKE COMPARABLE ADJUSTMENTS IN THEIR PLANS TO INCORPORATE LTDP RECOMMENDATIONS.

-

. OUR MAJOR DEFENSE EFFORT BEYOND THE SUMMIT WILL BE TO PURSUE EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-ON ACTION TO THE LTDP. AS WITH THE LAUNCHING OF THE INITIATIVES, THIS EFFORT WILL REQUIRE CONTINUED US LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE, TEMPERED BY UNDERSTANDING OF ALLIED CONCERNS.

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COOPERATION IN DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT:

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. DESPITE FREQUENT CLARION CALLS FOR INCREASED COOPERATION, THE RATE OF PROGRESS TOWARD STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT CONTINUES TO BE SLOW. TO FURTHER THE INITIAL STEPS TAKEN TOWARD INCREASED COOPERATION IN NATO, WE SHOULD:

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. - EXPAND THE TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE FROM THE NARROW EUROPEAN FOCUS ON REDUCING THE PRESENT IMBALANCE IN DEFENSE TRADE TO A WIDER SCOPE ENCOMPASSING EXAMINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC, TO IMPROVED DEFENSE EQUIPMENT COOPERATION AND

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PRACTICAL STEPS TO REDUCE THESE OBSTACLES.
-
. - FOLLOW-THROUGH ON THE CNAD WORK ON CO-PRODUC-
TION AND LICENSING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
IDENTIFIED BY THE CNAD IN THE FIELD OF TECHNICAL DATA,
INVENTIONS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS.
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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 ONY-00 /023 W
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P 160913Z FEB 78
FM USMISSION USNATO
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LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)
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. - ACTIVELY PURSUE THROUGH BOTH THE CNAD AND LTDP
TASK FORCES NATO ADOPTION OF THE "FAMILIES OF WEAPONS
SYSTEMS" APPROACH TO EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND
PROCUREMENT IN DIVERS MISSION AREAS.
-
. - ESTABLISH A NATO-WIDE NETWORK OF DEFENSE
EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU),
USING THE US-UK AGREEMENT AS A MODEL.
-
. - CONTINUE TO GIVE URGENT ATTENTION TO IDENTI-
FYING OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT OF
NATO EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD FURTHER STANDARDIZATION OBJEC-
TIVES. THE MOST PROMISING APPROACH APPEARS TO BE LICENSED
PRODUCTION OR CO-PRODUCTION OF EITHER EUROPEAN OR US

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DEVELOPED SYSTEMS AS THE ROLAND II, F-16 AND TANK GUN
EXPERIENCES INDICATE. THE US PATRIOT SURFACE-TO-AIR
MISSILE SYSTEM WOULD APPEAR AN IDEAL CANDIDATE FOR LICENSED
PRODUCTION OR CO-PRODUCTION IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD
REMAIN SENSITIVE TO THE POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE IMPACT OF
EC INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THIS PROCESS.
-
EAST-WEST STUDY:
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-
. THE EAST-WEST STUDY WILL BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE
WASHINGTON SUMMIT. IT WILL PROVIDE A HARD-HEADED ANALYSIS
OF FUTURE TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE --
HIGHLIGHTING, WE HOPE, ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES ABOUT WHAT
MIGHT HAPPEN THERE IN THE EIGHTIES -- AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE ALLIANCE. THE STUDY WILL LIKELY CONCLUDE, INTER ALIA,
THAT WITHIN THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT FIELD THE
SCOPE FOR WESTERN INFLUENCE ON SOVIET ATTITUDES SEEMS
LIMITED AND WILL MOST PROBABLY REMAIN SO UNTIL THE MID-
OR LATE-1980S, AND THAT MAINTENANCE OF FORMIDABLE MILITARY
POWER WILL REMAIN THE DOMINANT FEATURE OF KREMLIN THINKING.
ACCORDINGLY, THE EAST-WEST STUDY CAN BE EXPECTED TO RE-
INFORCE THE NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE TO PURSUE ITS SHORT- AND
LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAMS WITH VIGOR AND DETERMINATION.
-
. WE ARE STILL UNSURE WHETHER THE FRENCH WILL EVENTU-
ALLY AGREE TO INCLUDE IMPLICATIONS OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF
DEFENSE. BUT IN ITSELF THE STUDY SHOULD MARK AT LEAST THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF A FULLY ALLIED (AND NOT US-IMPOSED) ANALYSIS
OF THE NATURE OF THE ADVERSARY -- AND BY SO DOING CAN HELP
BOLSTER THE CONCEPTUAL COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE.
-
. BUT TO HAVE AN IMPACT THE STUDY SHOULD BE READ AND
DISCUSSED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS AND ITS PRINCIPAL CONCLU-
SIONS SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. THUS, BOTH A SUMMARY AND AN
UNCLASSIFIED RELEASE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR APPROVAL IN
CAPITALS WELL BEFORE THE SUMMIT.
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II.
THE ALLIANCE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM:
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THE US CONSULTATION RECORD IS EXCELLENT, AND THE CONSUL-
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TATIVE PROCESS AT NATO HAS BEEN BOLSTERED OVER THE PAST

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YEAR BY HIGH-LEVEL US VISITORS,INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT.
IN OUR VIEW, THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ON OCCASION AVOID
EITHER THE APPEARANCE OR REALITY OF A "DIRECTORATE"
APPROACH TO CONSULTATIONS. MOREOVER, SOME CONSULTATIONS
AT NATO ARE FRANKLY DISAPPOINTING, BECAUSE ALLIED REP-
RESENTATIVES ARE TIMID OR INSUFFICIENTLY EXPERT ON COMPLEX
SUBJECTS. BUT, AS WE HAVE STATED BEFORE, WE BELIEVE IT
ESSENTIAL TO WORK EVEN THE MOST SENSITIVE ISSUES IN AN
ALLIANCE-WIDE CONTEXT TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.
WE MUST EXPECT THE ALLIES TO REACT UNFAVORABLY TO THE
APPEARANCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PERSISTENT PATTERN IN
WHICH KEY DISCUSSIONS ON KEY ISSUES ARE HELD AMONG THE
SAME SELECT FEW. WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT A SENSE OF
ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND PARTICIPATION IS PARTICULARLY IM-
PORTANT TO THE MIDDLE AND SMALLER COUNTRIES. THE VIEWS OF
A SMALL SCANDINAVIAN STATE, FOR INSTANCE, MAY NOT LOOM
LARGE IN OUR ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS, BUT THE WILLING-
NESS OF SUCH A STATE TO STAND UP TO SOVIET PRESSURE IS NOT
UNRELATED TO ITS SENSE OF BEING A FULLY CONSULTED ALLY.
THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE IS WEAKENED WHEN, OWING TO A FEELING
OF HAVING BEEN EXCLUDED, THE SMALLER MEMBERS BECOME LESS
CERTAIN OF US SUPPORT AND FEEL MORE EXPOSED TO SOVIET
PRESSURES.

-

WE WILL CONTINUE TO DRAW WASHINGTON'S ATTENTION TO ISSUES
ON WHICH CONSULTATION IN NATO SEEMS USEFUL OR VITAL TO
ALLIED COHESION, AND WE WILL PRESS ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES
HERE TO ENSURE THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS (WITHIN THEIR CAPA-
BILITIES) MATCH THE IMPRESSIVE US CONTRIBUTION AND COMMIT-
MENT TO NATO CONSULTATIONS.

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FRENCH RESTRAINT ON NATO CONSULTATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE
A PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN LESS PRICKLY THAN
IN THE PAST. WE WILL SUGGEST FORA AND APPROACHES LIKELY

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 ONY-00 /023 W
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P 160913Z FEB 78
FM USMISSION USNATO
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TO REDUCE THE CHANCE OF CONVERTING QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE INTO ONES OF PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE FRENCH WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO TAKE A STAND.

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MBFR:

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THE UNIQUE MBFR CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE WORKED WELL TO DATE. HOWEVER, THE ENTIRE PROCESS COULD COME UNDER INCREASING STRAIN BECAUSE OF THE DIVERSE INTERESTS OF ALLIED PARTICIPANTS, THE QUICKENING AWARENESS OF LINKAGES BETWEEN MBFR AND OTHER DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, AND UNFORSEEN CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY, TACTICS AND FORCE STRUCTURES SINCE MBFR BEGAN. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE EMPHASIS ON THE OVERALL POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTEXT OF MBFR AS WELL AS EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT US ANALYSES CONCENTRATE LESS ON THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE MBFR PROCESS AND MORE ON ITS BROADER ASPECTS.

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CSCE:

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AFTER BELGRADE WE HOPE TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS AT NATO ON BOTH IMPLEMENTATION AND EVENTUAL PREPARATIONS FOR

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MADRID, WITHOUT RAISING QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE. MOST ALLIES WILL SUPPORT THIS COURSE. BUT, WE EXPECT THERE WILL BE SOME PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION WITH THE FRENCH AND THE EC, SINCE CLOSE COORDINATION ON CSCE HAS BEEN THE MAJOR SUCCESS OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE NINE. WE WILL WANT TO ENSURE THAT WORK OF THE NINE AND OF NATO IS SO CLEARLY INTERTWINED THAT OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE EC-9 BEFORE IT TAKES DECISIONS OF IMPORTANCE TO NATO IS ENHANCED. IF NECESSARY, THE US SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO INSIST THAT TO MATCH THE QUALITY OF OUR CONTRIBUTIONS ON SALT AND OTHER ISSUES AT NATO, WE, IN TURN, EXPECT MEANINGFUL CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSULTATIONS HERE SHOULD AIM TO EXPOSE AND UNDERCUT SOVIET EFFORTS TO BLAME THE US AND SPLIT US FROM OUR ALLIES ON THIS ISSUE, WHILE REINFORCING PRACTICAL ALLIED EFFORTS TO GIVE REALITY TO FINAL ACT PROVISIONS.

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TURKEY, GREECE AND NATO:

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GREEK AND TURKISH FRUSTRATION AT NATO HAS SHARPENED IN THE

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PAST YEAR, REFLECTING BROADER EFFORTS BY BOTH TO USE THEIR LEVERAGE HERE AGAINST EACH OTHER. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO MANAGE THE GREECE-NATO NEGOTIATIONS (AND THE GROWING TURKISH PRESSURE ON GREECE IN THE CONTEXT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SO AS TO PREVENT THEM FROM ADVERSELY AFFECTING WASHINGTON'S EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE US-GREEK TURKISH MALAISE. WE BELIEVE WE CAN KEEP PROBLEMS AT NATO WITHIN TROUBLING BUT MANAGEABLE LIMITS.

-

WASHINGTON WILL WANT TO BE ALERT TO THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECENT GREEK STRESS ON A LINKAGE BETWEEN SIGNING THE US-GREEK DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND MOVEMENT ON THE GREECE-NATO RELATIONSHIP, A CONNECTION WHICH CARAMANLIS

EMPHASIZED DURING HIS RECENT EUROPEAN TOUR. FOR THEIR PART, THE TURKS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE NO PROGRESS ON GREEK REINTEGRATION UNTIL THE US-TURKISH DCA IS APPROVED. BOTH SIDES MUST BE NUDGED FROM THESE CONFLICTING POSITIONS, AND WE WELCOME WASHINGTON'S VIEW OF THE "NATO CONNECTION" IN THE WAKE OF CARAMANLIS'S CALL FOR ACCELERATED GREECE-NATO NEGOTIATIONS.

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POSSIBLE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN ALLIED GOVERNMENTS:

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THE ITALIAN AND FRENCH POLITICAL SITUATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN TOPICS OF DISCUSSION AT NATO. NEITHER WOULD PERMIT SUCH DISCUSSION, AND ALLIES ARE GENERALLY RELUCTANT, AND HAVE NO BRIEF, TO TACKLE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES. AT THE SAME . TIME, NATO OFFICIALS DO NOT OVERLOOK THE THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE OR THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF NATO MATERIAL INHERENT IN POSSIBLE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN MEMBER GOVERNMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY SOUNDINGS WITH OTHER ALLIES ABOUT POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA SHOULD BE BILATERAL. ACTIONS AT NATO SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH A VIEW TO THEIR POLITICAL IMPACT AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF LEAKS. MOREOVER, VAST QUANTITIES OF NATO CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ARE IN ITALIAN AND FRENCH NATO SUB-REGISTRIES, AND NO AMOUNT OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING WILL CHANGE THAT FACT. IF SPECIFIC MOVES HERE EVER BECOME NECESSARY, THE ALLIES WILL LOOK TO THE US FOR LEADERSHIP.

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THE NORTHERN FLANK:

-

THE SOVIETS ARE ASSERTING RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES IN THE NORTH CONSONANT WITH AN ADVANCED DEFENSE PERIMETER AND THE LEVERAGE THEY GAIN ON ALL THE NORDICS FROM THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH FINLAND. SOVIET ENCROACHMENTS APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN ON A NEW DIMENSION, AND WE ARE MINDFUL THAT COUNTRIES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE SEA DO NOT HAVE A HAPPY

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HISTORY. SO ARE THE NORDICS.
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AT NATO, THE ALLIES ARE INCREASINGLY ALERT TO THIS SOVIET PRESSURE. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL BE WILLING TO FACE THE ISSUE HEAD ON HERE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN NOR-

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FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9315

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LIMDIS

FOR EUR ONLY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR TEXT (DESTROY ALL OTHERS)

WEGIAN SENSITIVITIES. TO THE DEGREE THE NORDICS FIND IT HELPFUL, WE MUST ASSURE THEY FEEL THE ALLIANCE IS FIRMLY BEHIND THEM.
-
THE US MAY EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BE TOUGH BILATERALLY ON THIS WITH THE SOVIETS, MAKING CLEAR TO THEM THAT PRESSURE ON THE NORDICS CAN AFFECT OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS. WE SHOULD NOT, OF COURSE, MAKE ANY SUCH APPROACH WITHOUT CONSULTING THE ALLIES.
-
SPAIN AND NATO:
-
WE DO NOT SEE ANY CLEARCUT TRENDS IN SPAIN WHICH SUGGEST A PUBLICLY SUPPORTED INCLINATION TO JOIN THE ALLIANCE. THE PROCESS SEEMS TO BE ON DEAD CENTER AS A RESULT OF INTERNAL DYNAMICS IN SPAIN, INCLUDING THE PSOE'S APPROACH TO NATO

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MEMBERSHIP. ALONG WITH WASHINGTON AND EMBASSY MADRID, WE
HAVE PROPOSED SPECIFIC STEPS THAT WE CAN ALL TAKE TO HELP
ENCOURAGE SPANISH MEMBERSHIP. MILITARY CONTACTS AND EMBASSY
MADRID'S VIGOROUS EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS MAY BE HAVING AN IM-
PACT, BUT IT DOES NOT SEEM TO US THAT THE VARIOUS STRANDS
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HAVE COME TOGETHER. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO GO AS FAR AND AS
FAST AS THOSE IN SPAIN WHO FAVOR MEMBERSHIP WANT US TO IN
SUPPORTING THEIR OWN EFFORTS. WE WILL WORK HERE TO HELP
LINK MADRID AND NATO INSTITUTIONALLY, BUT WE BELIEVE THE US
WILL NEED TO BE READY TO PRESS OUR ALLIES INTO THE PROCESS
OF EDUCATING ALL SPANIARDS, AND PARTICULARLY THE PSOE, ABOUT
NATO ONCE MADRID GIVES THE GO-AHEAD.
-
A CRUNCH MAY COME IN 1981 WHEN THE US-SPANISH TREATY EXPIRE S
UNLESS THERE IS A SEA CHANGE IN SPAIN. THUS, WITHIN THE
NEXT YEAR THE US SHOULD:
-
--REALISTICALLY CALCULATE THE CHANCE THAT SPAIN WILL ENTER
NATO PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE TREATY;
-
--INCORPORATE IN THIS CALCULATION THE IMPACT THAT A CSCE
FOLLOW-ON MEETING IN MADRID MIGHT HAVE ON A SPANISH DECISION;
-
--CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE US IF IT APPEARS THAT OUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH SPAIN WILL HAVE TO REMAIN A BILATERAL ONE.
IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO FUNDING
REQUESTS FOR BILATERAL BASE ACCESS WILL BE A MAJOR DETERMI-
NANT.
-
PUBLIC AFFAIRS:
-
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDERSCORE THE NEED FOR CONSTANT
THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION BY THE US OF THE IMPACT UPON
EUROPEANS OF US OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON SIGNIFICANT
POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES.
-
SUMMIT-LEVEL ATTENTION AND US INITIATIVES HAVE STRENGTHENED
ALLIED PERCEPTIONS OF THE FIRM US COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE
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OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THERE IS A GROWING PUBLIC AWARENESS
OF INCREASING WARSAW PACT MILITARY STRENGTH. NONETHELESS,
THIS SHOULD NOT LEAD TO A SENSE OF COMPLACENCY REGARDING
EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION. ALLIES ARE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO

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NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND PERCEIVED CHANGES IN US POLICY, AND DOUBTS WILL EMERGE. PRESS SPECULATION ON PRM-10, DIATRIBES AGAINST THE "NEUTRON BOMB" AND CHARGES THAT IN SALT NEGOTIATIONS THE US MAY ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ON SYSTEMS SEEN AS VITAL TO THE THEATER BALANCE CAN ADVERSELY INFLUENCE EUROPEANS' PERCEPTION OF THE US COMMITMENT.

-

WE DO NOT SEE THE NEED FOR A MAJOR INFORMATION CAMPAIGN. RATHER, WE RECOMMEND A STEADY, BUT LOW-KEY PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM, DRAWING ATTENTION TO INCREASED US CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO, EMPHASIZING THE CONTINUITY OF THE US COMMITMENTS TO WESTERN EUROPE, AND SETTING AND KEEPING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, PARTICULARLY ON PARAMOUNT ISSUES AFFECTING THE ALLIANCE. HOWEVER, AS OUR LACK OF SUCCESS IN COMBATTING SOVIET ATTACKS ON THE "NEUTRON BOMB" SUGGESTS, WE SHOULD BE READY TO TAKE STEPS TO COUNTER AND PREEMPT SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS. FROM HERE, IT APPEARS WE SHOULD--AS THE PRESIDENT DID IN WARSAW--RESPOND DIRECTLY AND PUBLICLY TO SOVIET CHARGES MORE FREQUENTLY THAN WE DO. ALL TOO OFTEN WE SEEM TO LEAVE THE FIELD TO THEM. BENNETT

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978USNATO01553
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: n/a
Format: TEL
From: USNATO
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780244/aaaablbc.tel
Line Count: 784
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Message ID: 666447d5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY, LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 15
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY, LIMDIS
Reference: 77 STATE 291277, 77 STATE 296053, INTRODUCTION
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3567734
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AT NATO
TAGS: AMGT, XX, NATO
To: SECSTATE WASHDC
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/666447d5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
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20 Mar 2014
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